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Delinquency Proceedings-
Fundamental Fairness for the
Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum
Informal procedures are consistent with the reformative
and rejuvenative objectives of the juvenile courts, but Mr.
Welch argues that the pursuit of these objectives should
not excuse the disregard of Constitutionally guaranteed
procedural rights. While recognizing the desirability of
reducing the criminal stigma attached to juvenile pro-
ceedings, the author argues for the retention of procedural
rights commensurate with the potential punitive disposi-
tion of the hearings. Mr. Welch also discusses the role of
the attorney in a juvenile delinquency hearing, laying
particular emphasis on the problems arising from the con-
flicting interests the attorney is often called upon to
simultaneously represent.
Thomas A. Welch*
The juvenile courts were originally conceived as a progressive
social experiment for treating juvenile offenders in specially de-
signed forums. As such the idea departed significantly from the
traditions of criminal law. The objective was an institutionalized
curative device whereby juveniles deviating from the norms of
accepted social behavior could be brought under the paternal
protection and instruction of the state. The state would then
provide the proper influences and, if necessary, a more appropri-
ate environment for the juvenile during his formative years. State
power for implementing these notions was found in the state's
role as parens patriae, providing for the protection of unfortunate
children. Precedent for the law was found in the authority of
English courts of equity to manage children's property in their
behalf. American courts thereby concluded that juvenile courts
were "noncriminal" by their very nature. The proceedings were
*Member of the California bar.
1. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HIAnv. L. REv. 104, 106 (1909); Nicholas,
History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 . F.mrmy L. 151,
162 (1961).
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to be protective rather than punitive. A corollary of this con-
clusion was that protection from the state was unnecessary, for the
state was pursuing the juvenile respondent's ultimate benefit.2
I. SOCIALIZING TREATMENT OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY
To effectuate the above objectives, those elements of criminal
prosecution generally recognized to give rise to the need for
special procedural protections were eliminated. These elements
were: (1) the public scorn which attaches to the convicted crimi-
nal, and (2) the punitive character of the disposition of the case.
A. ELIMINATION OF SocIA STIGMA
Legislation establishing special juvenile proceedings generally
prescribes that a finding of delinquency shall not be deemed a
conviction of crime or be civilly disabling s These statutes gen-
erally provide for a private hearing;4 the use of the evidence heard
in juvenile court, the finding of delinquency, and the disposition
made upon such a finding in any other court proceeding is pro-
hibited.5 Records are generally kept confidential. The criterion
used in evaluating these measures is their practical effectiveness
in removing the stigma resulting from a juvenile court determina-
tion of antisocial behavior.6
Prior to the enactment of juvenile acts, criminal prosecutions
against juveniles were the same as those against adults, including
2. Cf. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 Atl. 678 (1923); People v. Lewis,
260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932); Holmes' Appeal,
379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955). See gen-
erally Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1959); 41 CoR-
L.Q. 147, 151 n.24 (1955).
3. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2308 (Supp. IV, 1965); ALss. GEN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 60 (1951); N.Y. F mmy CAT. ACT § 781-82; Oau. REV. STAT.
§ 419.543 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 261 (1965); VA. CODE 'ANN. § 16.1-
179 (Supp. 1960).
4. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (Supp. IV, 1965); N.Y. FAMImY CT. AcT
§ 741. Compare CAL,. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 676 (accused may have a
public trial on request); ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.498 (1963) (public trial allowed
on request, but judge retains discretion to exclude persons).
5. See McCoRwICK, EviDENcE § 43, at 91 (1954); 1 WiGmoRE, EVDENCE
§ 196, at 673 n.5 (3d ed. 1940 Supp. 1964); Antieau, Conwtitutional Rights in
Juvenile Court, 46 CoREIm L.Q. 387, 407 (1961); Rappeport, Some Legal
Aspects of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 46 VA. L. REv. 908, 914-15 (1960).
6. See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MIwN. L. REv. 547,
554 (1957).
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the same procedural safeguards. The disposition of the case and
the public's impression of the convicted were both oriented to the
gravity of the violation. The philosophy and design of the juvenile
courts is that neither a finding of delinquency nor the disposition
of the matter is necessarily indicative of the gravity of the re-
spondent's misconduct. Indeed, a juvenile who has not violated
any criminal statute may be found delinquent and given a dispo-
sition identical to that given a juvenile for conduct amounting to a
felony if committed by an adult.8 The public is left to speculate
about the matter. Specific inquiry is bound to lead to stigmatizing
the juvenile who must answer that his "delinquency" was an act
of felony proportions. As a practical matter, however, the lesser
offender may be condemned to the same stigma by the "de-
linquent" label without an opportunity to explain that his conduct
was truly noncriminal.
Protective measures restrict official disclosure of delinquency
findings, but they do not prevent future employers and others
from asking the person affected about his previous record. The
opportunity to respond to such an inquiry that by legislative
decree any prior determination of delinquency should not be con-
sidered the same as a criminal conviction does little to erase the
stigma. The realization that society does not regard a delinquency
record in the manner prescribed by statute is reflected in a joint
statement by the Los Angeles Bar Association, Los Angeles
County Juvenile Court Judges, and the Chief Probation Officer of
Los Angeles County:
b) Although disposition of a delinquency proceeding in the Juvenile
Court does not give rise to a criminal record for the minor, a minor's
Juvenile Court record frequently is inquired into by bonding companies,
prospective employers, and the Armed Services.9
Similarly, there are instances where officials might use a record of
juvenile delinquency despite statutory barriers.10 Perhaps no
7. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.D.C. 1955). See also Antieau,
s-upra note 5, at 407.
8. See, e.g., ORE. R Ev. STAT. §§ 419.476, .509, .511 (1963); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16.1-158,-180 (Supp. 1960).
9. Committee on Juvenile Courts, Los Angeles Bar Association, The Attor-
ney and the Juvenile Court, 30 Los ANGxT B. BuLL. 333, 335-37 (1955);
cf. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952);
Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 610, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185
Va. 335, 38 S.E2d 444 (1946).
10. See People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303 (1943), where
the Michigan Supreme Court upheld impeachment of a juvenile witness in a
criminal proceeding by reference to previous difficulty with juvenile authorities.
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scheme can prevent criminal stigma attaching as long as individ-
uals in society react to the idea of delinquency according to per-
sonal compunction and can identify the "delinquent." Acting on
the assumption that stigma primarily is related to the label of
"delinquency," at least two states have taken legislative steps to
change the use of that term.
The 1961 California Juvenile Court Act" employs the term
"ward of the court" to cover both cases involving the violation of
criminal statutes," and those involving less specific notions of
juvenile waywardness.' Portions of the act distinguish these two
types of wards for determining the quality of evidence needed to
support jurisdiction 4 and in prescribing the court's powers on
disposition.'5
Whatever effectiveness this change in terminology has will
cease when society equates the old concept of delinquency with
the new label of ward of the court. While the change announces a
new official attitude that juvenile offenses are not to be equated
with adult crimes, a similar change in private attitudes is doubtful.
To be more successful than prior statutory measures denominating
delinquency as noncriminal, this scheme depends on society's
unawareness that officially the term "delinquency" has been elimi-
nated. When employers, for example, become aware of the elimina-
tion of the term "delinquency," it challenges credibility to believe
a changed label will result in "wards" receiving equal consideration
to that given nonward job applicants. It should be remembered
that the word "delinquency" was itself employed to distinguish
the errant juvenile from ingrained notions of criminality. It is
apparent the California legislature did not feel a change in labels
would totally eliminate the stigma of delinquency.'6 This is shown
by provisions which would allow the court, in its discretion, to
treat a noncriminal ward of the court in a manner very similar to
the treatment accorded a ward guilty of criminal conduct. 17
11. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 500-914.12. Id. § 602.
13. Id. J 601.
14. Id. § 701. A proceeding to determine a juvenile to be within the court's
jurisdiction is paralleled to criminal procedure in the case of a "ward of the
court" under § 602, and to civil procedure in the case of a "ward of the
court" under § 601.
15. Id. §§ 730, 731. Commitment to the Youth Authority is authorized
only in the case of juveniles found to be wards of the court under §§ 601, 602.
16. See In re Mikkelsen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Dist.
Ct.'App. 1964).
17. See CAL. WELFARn & INST'NS CoDn, §§ 601, 634, 731.
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Another recognition that stigma may attach to a ward of the
court is the distinct label "dependent child of the court" given
to cases coming under the court's dependency and neglect juris-
dictions.' 8 These cases would traditionally be described as true
instances of wardship. It must be concluded that the legislature
deemed it desirable to differentiate such cases from those where
the child's own conduct is the principal subject for determination
and correction.' 9
The California act attempts to combat stigma by allowing a
person under the court's jurisdiction to request all records of the
proceeding to be sealed. This request may be made five years after
the termination of the juvenile court's jurisdiction of the case.
Once such records are sealed, the proceedings "will be deemed
never to have occurred," and the petitioner "may properly reply
accordingly to any inquiry."2 0 The issuance of such an order is in
the discretion of the juvenile court judge.2 '
Is this mechanism, coupled with safeguards against official
disclosure in the interim, effective in removing criminal stigma?22
To a certain extent the answer is yes, but why should such pro-
ceedings be disclosed at all?2 3 Since jurisdiction may continue
until majority is reached2 4 this provision will often not be avail-
able until the age of twenty-six. It has little practical effect in
removing the blot on reputation since most persons will seek em-
ployment before that age. Finally, there is no provision which
requires notice to be given to the minor of his right to petition
18. Id. § 600.
19. At least one California appellate court recognizes that stigma has not
been eliminated -by the 1961 act. In In re Mikkelsen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467,
S8 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964), the court cited and quoted from
In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 683 (Dist. Ct. App.
1952), to the effect that being declared a ward of the court when based upon
a felony charge "is a blight upon the character of and is a serious impediment
to the future of such minor." 226 Cal. App. 2d at 471, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
20. CAL. WARE & INST'xS COD, § 781.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. § 827 limits access to juvenile court records to the persons immedi-
ately involved "and such persons as may be designated by the judge of the
juvenile court." See also 40 Ops. CAL. ATr'y GN. 50 (1962), wherein it is
stated that any agency should respond to inquiries made after the entry of an
order under § 781 that it has no record on the petitioner.
23. See 43 OPs. CAL. A'r'y Gmr. 288, 290-91 (1964), wherein it is stated
that the minor must admit to inquiries about arrest and detention by juvenile
authorities until an order is entered under § 781, and an employer has a right
to make such inquiries.
24. CAL. WEFARE & INST'NS CODE § 607.
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for sealing his record.25 All in all, the California provision for
sealing juvenile court records affords a shield against private in-
quiry and is a good scheme for defeating social stigma, but unfor-
tunately it becomes operative too late to effectively accomplish
its goal.
A somewhat different method of combatting social stigma is
used by the New York Family Court Act of 1962. The term
"delinquency" is retained only to describe juveniles who have
violated a criminal statute.20 Habitually disobedient juveniles or
those beyond parental control are described as "person(s) in need
of supervision. 12 7 The act narrowed the scope of the term "delin-
quency" to "accord with the common understanding that it refers
to someone who commits a crime and requires official treat-
ment. ' 8 The distinction between delinquent and person in need
of supervision is reflected in the court's powers of disposition since
only juveniles adjudged delinquent may be confined 9
The purpose of the differentiation is to confine and focus the
aura of criminality on the label delinquent. This approach, unlike
the California effort, attempts to minimize social disapprobation
of noncriminal juveniles within the juvenile court jurisdiction.
On its face, this approach affords substantial relief to the juvenile
who has committed no criminal act. But there is no longer any
doubt that in New York a juvenile adjudged a delinquent is ex-
posed to unambiguous criminal stigma. Although the court's deter-
mination of delinquency is not officially deemed a conviction, the
act says, in essence, that delinquent means criminal.
Does the New York Family Court Act adequately insulate a
person in need of supervision from the stigma undoubtedly attach-
ing to the delinquent? It is essential that the noncriminal juvenile
be called something other than delinquent, and that the label he
is given represents a sharply defined category of noncriminal
activity. It is also essential as a practical demonstration of this
theoretical distinction that he is consistently treated differently
from the delinquent. Seemingly the provisions empowering the
juvenile court to confine the delinquent, but not a person in need
of supervision, afford this different treatment 2  Unfortunately,
25. See Comment, 51 CAi. L. REV. 421, 446 (1963).
26. N.Y. FA'my CT. ACT § 712 (a).
27. Id. § 712(b).
9,8. Id. § 712, committee comments. See also Oughterson, Family Court
Jurisdiction, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 467, 474 (1963).
29. N.Y. FAmrmy CT. ACT § 731.
30. See id. §§ 731-32.
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this distinction is blurred upon closer examination, for both a
delinquent and a person in need of supervision may be "placed"
in the custody of an "authorized agency" for up to eighteen
months8 1 Faced with the ambiguity of the term "authorized
agency," a family court judge decided in 1962 that a person in
need of supervision could be placed in a state training school for
girls.3 which is the normal place for confinement of juveniles
found delinquent 3 The court stated:
[A] "person in need of supervision" must be interpreted to mean what
it really is, a category of delinquency as to which the legislature directs
the use of a different label, the substitution of the softer word "place"
for "commit," and the review of these placements at the end of eighteen
months .... 34
The following year the New York legislature amended the
Family Court Act provision for the placement of delinquents and
persons in need of supervision. Unfortunately, this did not correct
the court's interpretation but specifically authorized the place-
ment of persons in need of supervision in state training schools0m
Although the New York Court of Appeals has subsequently
held that a person in need of supervision cannot be placed in a
state reformatory designated as suitable for the confinement of
delinquents, 6 the qualitative difference between confinement and
placement in a state training school remains unexplained. If non-
31. See id. §§ 781-32, 756. Provision is made for extentions upon review of
the case.
32. In Te Doe, 232 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Family Ct. 1962).
33. N.Y. FA ,Ly CT. ACT § 758.
34. 232 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
35. N.Y. FA.nLy CT. ACT § 756(d).
36. Fish v. Horn, 14 N.Y.2d 905, 200 N.E.2d 857, 252 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1964).
N.Y. FAnLY CT. ACT § 758 designates Westfield Farm, run by the State
Department of Correction, as a suitable place for the commitment of delin-
quent girls. The state training schools of New York are run by the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare. In Anonymous v. People, 20 App. Div. 2d 395, 247
N.Y.S.2d 323 (1964), the appellate division originally held that the place-
ment of a girl found to be a person in need of supervision at Westfield Farm
could not be ordered under the Family Court Act § 756, since it was not an
authorized agency within the meaning of that section. In doing so, the court
shed considerable doubt on the nonpunitive nature of committing delinquents
to that institution by stating:
The entire structure of the Act reflects a deliberate and calculated plan
to place "persons in need of supervision" in authorized agencies for
treatment and rehabilitation and not to commit them to penal institu-
tions. Placement in a reformatory such as Westfield State Farm would
frustrate the avowed purpose of the statute.
20 App. Div. 2d at 400, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
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criminal juveniles are continually placed in the same facilities as
confined delinquents, it is quite clear that the person in need of
supervision is merely a category of delinquency as to which the
legislature directs the use of a different label. When a family
court tersely negates the theory of differentiation designed to
minimize criminal stigma and the legislature eliminates any
meaningful statutory differentiation in treatment by immediately
ratifying that action, can the public be far behind in equating
the person in need of supervision with the delinquent?
The Family Court Act generates more criminal stigma for the
delinquent than existed before. Insofar as the person in need of
supervision becomes publicly equated with the delinquent, he too
will reap an increased burden of criminal stigma. Attempts to
divorce the aura of criminal stigma from juvenile transgressions
are perhaps better not undertaken at all until the determination
and resources of the state are marshalled to ensure sufficient
practical adoption of theory to practice to reorient individual atti-
tudes. Individuals become acclimated to the operation of a revo-
lutionary idea, and they are usually skeptical at the outset. Con-
tinued inability to realize theoretical plans in practice at some
point creates an insurmountable obstacle of public cynicism to
social change.
Legislative efforts to reduce stigma are justified since the
juvenile lacks a developed sense of responsibility and, therefore,
his accountability for his conduct should be lessened. However,
the notion that some price in terms of lesser procedural protec-
tion must be exacted for this special consideration seems wholly
foreign to the aim of maximizing protection of his interests.8! 7 In
light of the inherent flaws in attempts to reduce social stigma as
discussed above, the price amounts to an uncompensated confis-
cation of his rights to protection from acts of the state.
B. PUIIVE QuAITY OF Tim DisPosITioN
In order to minimize the punitive nature of the proceeding,
thus obviating the necessity of criminal procedural safeguards,
juvenile acts provide that a finding of delinquency does not
amount to a conviction and that incarceration or probation orders
37. Of. United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.D.C. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Ex parte Tahbel, 46
Cal. 'App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (Dist. CL App. 1920).
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are not punitive sentences."' Facilities for juveniles have been set
up which are physically independent of adult correctional facili-
ties,39 and which emphasize the rehabilitory rather than the
punitive aspect of detention.
Putting aside the feasibility of institutional character molding,
implementing these provisions has still not been up to expectation.
In many instances treatment facilities are little more than jails.O
The facility in our nation's capital for temporary detention of
juveniles before they have had a hearing was described as "solitary
confinement." Recalcitrant juveniles were confined in cells without
beds for periods of two to five days.41 Obviously these facilities are
not what was envisioned by the early advocates of socializing the
treatment of juveniles2 Such treatment is patently inconsistent
with the aims of juvenile courts and thus eliminates the rationale
for informal, summary procedures.
A related practice which defeats the nonpunitive philosophy of
juvenile courts is the transfer of committed juveniles to adult cor-
rectional institutions.3 In White v. Reid, the federal district
court for the District of Columbia ordered the release or transfer
of a juvenile held in a city jail upon an application for a writ of
habeas corpus. Later that year the same court received another
petition from the same defendant, who was confined this time in
an adult correctional facility.45 Due to the existence of a federal
statute which allows the transfer of juveniles from the National
Training School for Boys to adult correctional institutions,4 the
38. See, e.g., MALss. GEN. LAws ch. 119, J 53 (1951); PA. STAT. Aim. tit. 11,§ 261 (1939); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-179 (Supp. 1960).
39. Compare Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1951), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955), where the court viewed intermingling criminals
with juvenile delinquents as beneficial to the criminal rather than punitive to
the juvenile.
40. See Fried, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1319 (1963); Rappe-
port, supra note 5, at 911; Rubin, Protecting the Child in Juvenile Court, 43
J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 425 (1946).
41. Note, 49 GEO. L.J. 322, 337 (1960).
42. See Mack, supra note 1, at 114.
43. See Note, 49 GEo. LJ. 322, 353-56 (1960). The Federal Juvenile De-
linquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1964), allows the accused to elect juvenile
proceedings instead of criminal prosecution. This distinction from the D.C.
Juvenile Court Act was held to justify transfers from juvenile detention fa-
cilities to adult correctional institutions. See Sonnenberg v. Markley, 289 FY.d
126 (7th Cir. 1961). There has been no comparable appellate decision concern-
ing the validity of transfers under the Juvenile Court Act.
44. 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
45. See White v. Reid, 126 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1954).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1964).
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same court approved a similar transfer five years later.4 7 However,
it disapproved the practice later that year 48 and again the follow-
ing year.49 Apparently the practice is now informally discour-
aged, 10 but the statute remains. Thus, the constitutionality of such
transfers remains unresolved. It is unseemly for a court which
earlier recognized the need for procedural safeguards in juvenile
proceedings to subject the juvenile found delinquent without
many of those safeguards to punitive incarceration through the
devious route of transfers between juvenile and adult commitment
facilities." It is equally hard to understand what motivated Con-
gress to pass a statute which specifically defeats the stated pur-
pose of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act by allowing
such transfers. The protective motives of the Government are, at
best, questionable so long as this condition exists.
The power and limits of juvenile courts under state and federal
constitutions should not be determined by calling such proceedings
noncriminal.5 The Supreme Court of the United States stated
over twenty years ago: "[L]iberty of an individual is at stake....
Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he
is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of
fairness."' It is true that specific sections of the Bill of Rights
address themselves to federal criminal proceedings. Nevertheless,
as the quote above suggests, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment dictates procedural safeguards for noncriminal federal
hearings according to the degree of potential government inter-
ference with liberty. Similarly, the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment draws its content from "fundamental standards
of fairness" rather than from specific sections of the Bill of
Rights.54
No matter how parental the state becomes, it is still engaging
in state action subject to the restrictions of the fourteenth amend-
47. See Clay v. Reid, 178 F. Supp. 667 (D.D.C. 1959), appeal dismissed,
272 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
48. See Cogdell v. Reid, 188 F. Supp. 102 (D.D.C. 1959).
49. See Kauter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960).50. See Note, 49 GEo. L.J. 322, 856 (1960).
51. Compare Clay v. Reid, 173 F. Supp. 667 (D.D.C. 1959), iwith In re
Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
52. Cf. United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 1958)
(dictum); Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 616, 109 A.2d 528, 580 (1954) (dissent-
ing opinion), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
58. Bridges v. Nixon, 826 U.S. 185, 154 (1945).
54. Compare Adamson v. California, 382 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Con-
necticut, 802 U.S. 319 (1937).
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ment when it commits a juvenile. The fourteenth amendment
clearly restricts the state as parens patriae to acts short of those to
which a stern and benevolent parent might resort.V5 Only a very
strained reading of the fourteenth amendment allows a substan-
tially different measure of fairness when the deprivation of liberty
is motivated by good intentions. As Justice Brandeis warned us
over a generation ago, "experience should teach us to be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficent."56
Labeling a proceeding noncriminal allows a withdrawal from
the fundamental standards of fairness demanded in criminal cases
without analyzing the reason for those standards. Reformation
and rehabilitation as important objectives of criminal jurispru-
dence have been increasingly recognized by the Supreme Court.5 7
but there is no suggestion that such objectives justify a reduction
in the rights of the accused under fourteenth amendment due
process."5 However, there is a suggestion in the Court's opinions
that the fundamental standards vary according to the severity of
the possible sentence5 What is important in fourteenth amend-
ment due process is the degree of interference by the state, not the
motivation behind that interference.
The juvenile has every right under the fourteenth amendment
to decline surrendering his liberty in return for "guidance," and
to lead his life without official interference until such time as
the state can prove in an orderly and reliable procedure that his
conduct justifies state infringement of his liberty.60 After such a
55. See T.PPAN, JuvmmN DE NQ-uwcY 191 (1st ed. 1949); Diana, Rights
of Juvenile Delinquents: An Appraisal of Juvenile Court Procedures, 47 J.
CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 561, 561 (1957); Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure Be
Socialized Without Impairing Individual Rights?, 12 J. CaRr. L., C. & P.S.
389, 841 (1921).
56. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opin-
ion). Recently the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1045,
1055 (1966), specifically declined to consider the constitutional validity of the
parenw patriae rationale for reduced procedural safeguards.
57. Cf. Williams v. New York, 387 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (dictum).
58. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 385 (1963).
59. See Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 58, at 347 (concurring opinion).
In that case that the right to effective assistance of counsel was said to turn on
a "capital-non-capital punishment" dichotomy, and then on a "serious crime-
pety offense" dichotomy under fourteenth amendment due process.
60. See Pound, Foreword to YouNG, Socm TE A mNT IN PRoBATIoN
SDELINQUENCY at xiv-xv (2d ed. 1952); TAPPA, Juvmmm DELINQUENCY
191 (1st ed. 1949).
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determination has been made, the commendable motives and
objectives of reformation and rehabilitation do credit to our so-
ciety. Before such a determination has been made, however, these
objectives are merely expedient apologies for stripping proceed-
ings of safeguards designed to ensure standards of reliability con-
sistent with the degree of state power being exercised.
Paradoxically, on at least two occasions juvenile acts have
been found unconstitutional because the court was empowered to
fine delinquents without adhering to constitutionally ensured pro-
cedural rights.6' One such act authorized a maximum fine of
twenty-five dollars,6 but it was felt that a fine could only have
punitive effect. It is a highly theoretical distinction to say that a
twenty-five dollar fine is more punitive than commitment to a
state training school. This distinction is a result of analyzing four-
teenth amendment procedural requirements in terms of legislative
intent rather than in terms of the degree of state interference.
The critics who clamor for more procedural protection - or
restoration of what was removed by the juvenile acts - argue
that procedural requirements for juveniles should not be relaxed
until the court's disposition is not regarded as punitive. If pro-
cedural aspects of the hearing must be responsive to the disposi-
tion, then procedural changes which reduce personal rights will
conform to due process requirements when facilities, personnel,
and public attitudes improve. Perhaps, when that day comes, a
convincing argument can be made that a deprivation of liberty
following a finding of delinquency has no punitive aspect, the
prognosis of such treatment being predictable and the juvenile
demonstrably benefiting from his commitment.
II. CONFUSIONS BROUGHT ON BY INFORMALITY
The development of procedural safeguards in the juvenile
courts has been inhibited by widespread confusion in two areas.
One of these is the multiple jurisdiction of the juvenile court over
dependent, neglected, and delinquent children. Some courts have
not distinguished these different types of hearings,s although
61. See Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682
(1908); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 SXE.2d 444 (1946).
69. See Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, supra note 61, at 326, 115 N.W.
at 686.
63. See, e.g., Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 604, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 978 (1955), where Justice Stem supports his thesis that
juvenile court is a civil inquiry by referring to examples of neglected and
abandoned children, when the case before him was delinquenwj on allegation
of armed robbery.
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recent juvenile acts recognize the difference in the court's disposi-
tive powers. 4
A dependency determination may be ascertained through a
background investigation. The determination is only of the child's
physical status which can easily be demonstrated. The same is
true of a neglect determination, except where the alleged neglect
is nonphysical or where the proceeding is to take the child from
the custody of the parents. Educational and spiritual neglect
involve subtle fact determinations. Thus, if the parent is being
prosecuted for child neglect and may lose custody of his child, he
is clearly entitled to procedural safeguards commensurate with
the jeopardy to his interests0 5
In delinquency determinations the child is exposed to the label
of delinquent and possible commitment regardless of the severity
of his infraction."0 (This is not to say that courts habitually exer-
cise their full power in cases of minor infractions, but if a pro-
cedural rule is to check judicial discretion, the most logical test
for its need is a comparison of court power with guarantees of
reliability.) Juvenile courts may waive jurisdiction and transfer
the child to regular criminal courts. 7 The availability of such
transfer makes the juvenile hearing either a preliminary to crimi-
nal trial or dispositive on the merits within the discretion of the
juvenile court judge. Statutes defining delinquency beyond the
commission of a specific criminal offense are very vague. 8 Hence,
there is real need for the juvenile court to carefully determine what
the juvenile has done to attract the court's jurisdiction.
Over fifty years ago the emphasis of juvenile court was re-
ported as shifting from adjudication to disposition0 9 The child,
unlike the adult, was not to hang between freedom and punish-
ment depending on the finding of the case. Rather he was to have
help and cooperation even though the court found him delinquent.
64. See, e.g., CAL,. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§ 727, 730, 731; N.Y.
FA.-Y CT. AcT §§ 352, 731-32; ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.476, .509 (1965).
Compare VA. CODE ANw. §§ 16.1-158,-178 (Supp. 1960).
65. See Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
66. See, e.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§ 601-02, 780-31; ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 419.476, .509, .511 (1963); VA. CODE AN. §§ 16.1-158,-178,-180
(Supp. 1960). Compare N.Y. FAir~y CT. ACT § 758.
67. See, e.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 606; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
1553 (Supp. IV, 1965); MAlss. GEN. LAWS AN. ch. 119, § 61 (1965). Compare
N.Y. FA1ny CT. ACT § 713-15.
68. See, e.g., D.C. CoDE Axw. § 11-1551 (Supp. IV, 1965) ("Beyond con-
trol of his parent" and "deports himself as to injure or endanger himself or
the morals or safety of himself or others").
69. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 93 HIAnv. L. REv. 104, 106-07 (1909).
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This laudable motive should be duly acclaimed once the youngster
is found to be within the court's dispositive powers. For some rea-
son, however, this shift in emphasis was taken as license to aban-
don the attention traditionally bestowed on the fact finding stage
before determination in favor of greater effort to tailor a suitable
remedy. The following statement is illustrative of this attitude:
"[T]he problem for determination by the judge is not, 'Has this
boy or girl committed a specific wrong?' but 'What is he, how has
he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest
and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward
career?' "o70 This attitude has received second looks from soci-
ologists, courts, and legislators:
[A]lthough some of us feel we have some answers, actually there is far
less agreement than there was 50 years ago . . .. [T]he idea that
[the judge] might be taking away the parents' right to their child, or
his right to them, without any semblance of "due process" didn't occur
to us too often. We were too sure we knew what was right. 71
The net effect of these confusions has been that findings before
disposition have gravitated toward the lowest level of reliability.72
Some recent statutes have delineated the jurisdictional facts and
segregated the stages of the hearing, 3 but the confusions remain
most troublesome where procedure is largely in the court's dis-
cretion.
Regarding juvenile proceedings as informal and noncriminal,
the courts have been reluctant to examine the question of com-
pliance with due process requirements. What is happening in
juvenile courts is not generally disputed:
Children's cases are handled much like any other criminal cases except
that they many times fail to provide the protections that prevail in
criminal courts and are considered basic ingredients of justice....
The rights to a definite charge, counsel, a fair hearing, reasonably rele-
vant and convincing evidence, and appeal, which are ensured on even
the most trivial issues to adults, were not being afforded to children.7 4
70. Mack, supra note 69, at 119-20; of. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171,
183 N.E. 853, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932); Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599,
109 A.2d 523, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 978 (1954). See also Nicholas, History,
Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. FAMILY L. 151, 164-65
(1961).
71. Address by Alan Keith Lucas, White House Conference on Children
(1950), in PRocEnENSos: HEALTIt PUB ICATiOzrS INSTITUTE, INC. 127 (1950).
72. See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 176, 183 N.E. 353, 355, cert. denied,
289 U.S. 709 (1932).
73. See, e.g., CAL. WELFAI & INSr'NS CODE §§ 600-02, 701-06; N.Y.
FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 712, 742-46.
74. S. REP. No. 130, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1957).
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With the emphasis on disposition it is not hard to understand
how procedural safeguards have been ignored. During hearing on
disposition, the judge's discretion as to what he will hear and
what weight to accord it has been extremely broad" 5 It is impor-
tant to remember that every hearing has a due process standard
commensurate with it.70 The protection provided by the pro-
cedural standards of the fourteenth amendment pertains primarily
to the preliminary decision of whether any disposition is justified.
Therefore, these rights extend from the time the threat of depriva-
tion arises until actual deprivation is justified"
III. COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURTS
It has already been suggested that fundamental fairness is
chameleon-like, taking on the complexion of the proceeding
before the court. In a juvenile court neglect and dependency cases
are intermingled with delinquency cases on a crowded calendar 8
One can readily understand a judge seeking one expeditious pro-
cedure for all types of cases.
There is widespread belief that informal procedures foster a
closer relationship between judge and juvenile 9 In their quest
for informality, some juvenile court judges have resisted the
appearance of attorneys, fearing that attorneys will press for tra-
ditional criminal law procedures and will resist the court at every
stage of the proceedings. These influences, they believe, will even-
tually transform juvenile courts into junior criminal courts in
spite of efforts to keep them noncriminal80 The argument is often
made that because the court's sole interest is the child's welfare,
his interests are adequately protected by the judge and probation
officer 81
75. Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
76. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
77. See Committee on Juvenile Courts, Los Angeles Bar Association, The
Attorney and the Juvenile Court, 30 Los ANGELEs BAR BurL. 333, 335-37
(1955), wherein a joint statement by the Bar, juvenile court judges, and pro-
bation officials noted, "Constitutional safeguards are as applicable in a juvenile
court proceeding as in any other proceeding in which personal and property
rights are involved."
78. See Note, 49 GEo. LJ. 322, 357 (1960).
79. See Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 A.BAJ.
1206, 1207 (1960); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 IlARv. L. REv. 104, 120
(1909).
80. Cf. Alexander, supra note 79, at 1209; McKesson, Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Proceedings, 45 Mnix. L. Ray. 843, 851 (1961); Note, 10 STA.. L.
RIv. 471, 500-01 (1958).
81. See TAPvPA, JUVENILE DELxQUENcY 189 (1st ed. 1949); Tappan,
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Only five jurisdictions require appointment of counsel after
request and a finding of indigency,2 while another two will appoint
counsel in certain classes of cases. In seven jurisdictions the
appointment of counsel is within the court's discretion8 4 Five
other jurisdictions specifically permit counsel to appear, but do
not provide for court appointment."' Five provide for the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem - not necessarily an attorney - to
protect the juvenile's interests. 6 The remaining jurisdictions make
no specific mention of the right to counsel.
A. FIFH AND FOURTEENTH AmmmDimNT REQUIREMVENTS FOR
COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
To properly determine if counsel is essential to a fair hearing
in juvenile court, one must look at the court as seen by those
appearing before it. In delinquency proceedings the child's par-
ents are often the complaining parties.8 7 The social worker or
probation officer, although specially trained in methods of treat-
ment and rehabilitation, is viewed by the juvenile as agents of
the court who are primarily concerned with the disposition stage
of the hearing. This viewpoint is accentuated when the probation
officer is cast in the role of the prosecutor."" This leaves only the
judge and the child himself concerned with the child's interests
during the trial. To the juvenile the judge is often identified as the
opponent rather than as counsel, largely because of the court's
The Adolescent in Court, 37 J. Cmu. L.,C. & P.S. 216, 226-27 (1946); Note,
10 STAN. L. REv. 471 (1958).
82. Sbioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
IDAHo CODE ANN. § 16-1631 (Supp. 1965); AMEr. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2)
(Supp. 1965); N.Y. FAmY CT. AcT §§ 241-49; ORE. :REv. STAT. § 419.498
(1965).
83. CAL. WEFARE & INST'NS CODE § 634; MO. REV. STAT. § 211211 (1959).
84. ALA. CODE, tit. 13, § 359 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. 45-227 (1947);
IowA CODE § 232.15 (1962); MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 27.8178 (598.17) (1962);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 62.085 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904 (60) (1961); Wis.
STAT. § 48.25 (6) (1955).
85. In-r e Pulin, 10 N.H. 458, 129 A.2d 672 (1957); ME. RIv. STAT. ANw.
ch. 152-A, § 15 (Supp. 1963); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 7185-08 (1942); Miss. CoDE
ANN. § 7187-08 (Supp. 1964); NH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9 (1955); Oumo REV.
CODE § 2151.35 (Anderson Supp. 1964); R1. GE-N. LAws ANw. § 14--1-30 (Supp.
1965).
86. Thr,. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2007 (1963); KAw. GEN. STAT. ANNr. § 88-
821 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-29 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-25
(1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15--1193 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-178 (Supp.
1960).
87. See TARTAw, DELN QUENT GuLs IN COURT 98-99 (1947).
88. See TAPRAN, JuvENIE DELNQUENCy 189 (1st ed. 1949).
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dispositive power. The feeling of aloneness in an adult world is
inevitable. The presence of his own counsel could greatly alleviate
this feeling.
In addition to the desirability of counsel from the juvenile's
point of view, there are important substantive reasons as well.
His ability to persuade witnesses to appear in his behalf is far
less than that of an attorney, especially if the juvenile is detained
prior to the hearing.89 Assuming the child could obtain his
witnesses, he usually lacks an attorney's ability to bring out the
entirety of their testimony. Admittedly the judge may question
witnesses at length, but the scope of this interrogation does not
usually approach that of an attorney. The juvenile is also at a
great disadvantage regarding rules of evidence.
The right to remain silent is of little value without an under-
standing of waiver and scope of the privilege; for these reasons
also an attorney is essential. 0 Even where the child admits the
allegations, commitment should not be ordered without a con-
sideration of all factorsY' This consideration may well have due
process connotations although a delinquency determination was
previously made, for the validity of juvenile court procedures
depends largely on nonpunitive dispositions. Juveniles as a
class lack any political power, and where the parents are com-
plaining parties, there is not even any derivative political
posture.2 This makes it doubly important that the juvenile be
given the full protection of available procedural rights. The attor-
ney is good insurance of that result.
All in all, the picture is one of the minor's peculiar ineptitude
to fend for himself. The Supreme Court recognized long ago that
youth and immaturity are specially disabling factors necessitating
counsel to insure a fair hearing 3
Youth and inexperience often preclude awareness of procedural
rights as well as those arising under the state and federal consti-
tutions. 4 Little is done to assure a fair hearing if a defendant has
89. See GEILHoRN, CImrUnN AND FAmuIs n TE COURTS op NEw
YoRK 78 (1954) (juvenile respondent denied compulsory process in many
jurisdictions); Antleau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRxu=
L.Q. 387, 405 (1961).
90. See Note, 10 STAN. L. Rzv. 471, 497-98 (1958).
91. Cf. Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Mirs. L. REv. 1, 100-01 (1963).
92. See TAPPAN, DELnQuNT GmLS 3n COURT 98-99 (1947).
93. See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 385 U.S. 437 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 834
U.S. 672 (1948); of. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1982).
94. f. TAPPAN, Juvmq= DELINQU ccY 184 (1st ed. 1949); Antieau,
8upra note 89, at 395.
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certain rights but is not made aware of them. Counsel is essential
to ensure that rights are waived only after conscious considera-
tion 5 Mr. Justice Sutherland said in Powell v. Alabama96 over
30 years ago:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law... He is unfamiliar with the rules of evi-
dence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has
a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him.97
Viewed in terms of the greater need of the immature, and in
terms of deprivation of liberty and the stigmatizing label of de-
linquent, fundamental fairness requires counsel in juvenile de-
linquency proceedings 8 Parity suggests a right to counsel arises
under the fourteenth amendment when the juvenile is accused of
delinquency for conduct amounting to a serious crime if com-
mitted by an adult0 9 However, in juvenile delinquency cases the
defendant is often exposed to commitments in excess of those his
adult counterpart would receive' 00 There is no predictable rela-
tion between the seriousness of the crime and the maximum length
of commitment; rather the maximum term of commitment is a
function of the defendant's age at the time of the hearing -the
younger he is, the longer an indefinite commitment until majority
could be.' 01
There is another reason why older juvenile defendants have a
right to counsel. For youngsters over fourteen,10 2 or in some cases
sixteen, 03 the juvenile court may be only a preliminary hearing
95. See generally Note, 49 MxNN. L. REv. 1133 (1965).
96. 287 U.S. 45 (1989).
97. Id. at 69.
98. Cf. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 286 F.2d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
99. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 835, 351 (1961) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
100. TAPPAw, JrvuE~n DE Q ENcy 192 (lst ed. 1949); cf. Antieau,
8upra note 89, at 390.
101. See Dembitz, Ferment and Ex'periment in New York: Juvenile Cases
in the New Family Court, 48 ComnmLm L.Q. 499, 512 (1962). Compare N.Y.
FAMnY CT. AcT § 758, which limits confinement to a maximum of three
years.
102. See, e.g., Mlss. GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 61 (1965); VA. CODE AwN. §
16.1-176 (Supp. 1960).
103. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.533 (1963).
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before waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and certification for
trial in criminal court. In these instances the hearing record may
not be used against him in criminal court. 0 Nevertheless, without
the advice of counsel, the juvenile defendant may be potentially
prejudiced in at least three ways in a preliminary hearing. First,
he is not protected from the consideration of anything he may
have said in the hearing as a matter in aggravation on disposition
in the criminal court.0 5 Second, police officers are often in attend-
ance at such hearings, and the defendant is not protected from
the "fruits" of statements made at the hearing being used against
him in criminal court' 08 Finally, at least one court has held that
a witness in criminal court can be impeached by statements made
in juvenile court. 0 7 It might be added that an admission of guilt
in juvenile court, followed by its exclusion and the right to remain
silent in criminal court, smacks of trying to "stuff the cat back
into the bag." The defendant is psychologically disadvantaged
and more amenable to a negotiated plea of guilty in criminal
court. 0 8 Only under the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act can the
juvenile defendant avoid this preliminary hearing and proceed
immediately under the umbrella of criminal constitutional safe-
guards.109 Thus considering the above factors, everywhere -
except in the federal jurisdiction -juvenile delinquency hearings
for specific misconduct should be considered merely an extension
of criminal procedure.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel under
the fourteenth amendment extends to any critical court room
stage of a criminal proceeding' 10 In Escobedo v. Illinois,"' the
Court suggests that when the defendant first becomes accused he
has reached a critical stage if prevailed upon to make a statement.
The Escobedo court cites Hamilton v. Alabama12 and White v.
Maryland'" as support for the right to counsel at such a stage,
104. See authorities collected in note 5 supra.
105. See Commonwealth v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 144 A.2d 367 .(1958);
1 WIGmo, EvinuwcE § 196, at 673-76 (3d ed. 1940).
106. Cf. Gallegos v. People, 145 Colo. 53, 61-63, 358 P2ed 1028, 1032-33
(1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). But cf. Kozler v. New York
Tel. Co., 93 NJ,. 279, 108 At]. 375 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
107. State v. Searle, 125 Mont. 467, 239 P.2d 995 (1952).
108. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1964).
110. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961).
111. 878 U.S. 478 (1964).
112. S68 U.S. 52 (1961).
113. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
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but it does not recognize the distinction that in those cases the
critical stage was a court proceeding, whereas in Escobedo the
stage was police interrogation. The juvenile hearing is a court pro-
ceding where the defendant's inclination is naturally to resist
certification for trial as a criminal. Such an environment is con-
ducive to encouraging defendant's active entry into the proceed-
ings. In fact, the environment in juvenile court is designed to
encourage the juvenile defendant to be candid about his prior con-
duct. This is especially true where resistance might lead to cer-
tification for trial in criminal court.- 4 Thus, in a very real sense
the juvenile stands at the crossroad of two judicial systems.
The fourteenth amendment right to counsel in juvenile court
hearings does not depend on it being a junior criminal court. It
exists because of the threat of criminal treatment by certification
to criminal court. Theory makes a child exempt from the criminal
law, 1 5 yet practice holds him subject to criminal court proceedings
unless the court finds him suitable for treatment as a juvenile.
The system incorporates a pretrial interrogation step which is no
less critical because it is conducted before a judge rather than in
the station house.
The argument that counsel is not essential to a fair hearing in
juvenile court is largely fallacious. It boils down to propositions
that the juvenile is protected by the court, traditional criminal
safeguards are not applicable in juvenile court, and, therefore, an
attorney is not necessary to protect the juvenile's interests. This
amounts to an assertion that having stripped the proceedings of
most procedural protections very little is lost by making the denial
of procedural protection complete.
To the extent procedural devices designed to ensure a reliable
proceeding are abandoned, those remaining become more crucial
to the defendant."0 Due process clearly allows a defendant to
present matters tending to negate the validity of the allega-
tions." 7 If this is the defendant's only protection against an unjust
determination of delinquency, the skill with which it is managed
becomes critical. One leading authority on the juvenile courts has
put it as follows:
There should be an attorney for the defense in the court at all times to
114. See McKesson, supra note 80, at 846; Note, 10 STw. L. Rnv. 471, 475-
76 (1958).115. See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
116. See Dembitz, supra note 101, at 510.
117. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
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give legal guidance and advice to the [defendant]. This is the minimal
requirement for fair adjudication. If... the defendant is to 'be deprived
of a large section of her traditional right of due process by permitting
... gossip .. . community opinion ... there must be an opportunity
for an attorney representing the defendant to bring into the open the
source and nature of the evidence so that where the source is of inferior
credibility little weight will be attached to it.118
Additionally, the mere presence of an attorney in court restrains
the court's discretion. An attorney can ensure that determinations
will be grounded on competent evidence. He may also take and
perfect a timely appeal if necessary."9 Finally, the attorney is
essential to effectively present the defendant's view of the facts
supporting the allegations.
Fifth and fourteenth amendment due process embody a right
to have retained counsel appear in any proceeding which may
deprive a person of his liberty. °20 If the right to retain counsel is
of due process proportions, it logically follows that counsel,
whether retained or not, is essential to the fairness of the
hearing. 21 Douglas v. California ' largely eliminated the rela-
tive disadvantage a poor man had in his defense, by requiring
the appointment of counsel for an indigent under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment where the right to
retain counsel exists. Thus it would seem that equal protection and
due process require the appointment of counsel for the indigent
juvenile whose liberty is threatened in a delinquency proceeding.
B. WAImVR AND EQUAL PROTECTION
In jurisdictions where counsel is allowed, or will be appointed
on request, rarely is there any provision for informing the juvenile
of the right. 3 However, in California the child and his parents
118. TAPPAN, DELinQunn'T Gnms iN COURT 107-08 (1947).
119. Cf. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 936 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.
1956). See also Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert- Counsel in the Peno-
Correctional Process, 45 lum. L. REv. 803, 833 (1961); Kamisar & Choper,
supra note 91, at 94-101; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MN.
L. REv. 547, 571 (1957); Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized
Without Impairing Individual Rights?, 12 J. CUMa. L., C. & P.S. 339, 341
(1921).
120. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 310 (1954); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 69 (1932); En parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833, 838 (D. Mass. 1915).
121. See Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to
Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Micu. L. REv. 219, 227-28 (1962).
122. 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
123. Cf. Riederer, Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court, 2 FAmLY L.J. 16, 19
(1962).
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must be informed at a detention hearing and in the notice of hear-
ing on a petition of the right to appear with counsel. The child
or parent may then request appointed counsel if unable to
retain counsel.2 4 This notice may not be waived. 25 At the hear-
ing the judge must satisfy himself that notice has been given
before he may proceed in the absence of counsel. 26 The California
Supreme Court has decided, however, that the judge may satisfy
himself from the record that notice has been given. He is not
required to ascertain by inquiry at the petition hearing that the
right to counsel has been waived' 2 7
This overt circumvention of the purpose of the statute can
only be explained as a perpetuation of the attitude that juvenile
proceedings are more effective in the absence of counsel. 8 The
statute leaves the method of ensuring proper notice of right to
counsel to the judge's discretion; it seems a clear violation of that
discretion to prefer a less reliable means over a more certain and
expeditious means. The juvenile judge should, in open court,
obtain the parties' verbal acknowledgment of notice and waiver
of counsel.129
Where counsel is provided when requested, the right is only as
good as the awareness of that right. One cannot be held to have
made an intelligent choice between requesting counsel and pro-
ceeding pro se when he is unaware of an alternative. The affluent
will hire an attorney, perhaps totally unaware of the right to
appointed counsel. His ignorance of that alternative does not
prejudice his rights under the statute. The indigent who knows
of his right to request counsel will get procedural protection
equivalent to the affluent defendant. However, the accused who
is both indigent and ignorant of his right to appointed counsel
must depend on the court to so advise him if he is to receive
equivalent protection.80
124. CAL. WEIFAnE & INs T'ss CoDs §§ 633-59. See also N.Y. F mmy CT.
AcT §§ 728, 741.
125. Cf. 36 Ors. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 85, 89 (1960).
126. CUL. WELFARE & INST'NS CoDE § 700.
127. In re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 877 Pr2d 74 (1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 838 (1968).
128. See McKesson, supra note 80, at 847; Note, 10 ST&w. L. Rv. 471,
500 (1958).
129. Cf. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.Rd 666 (D.C. Cir.
1956); In re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 877 P.2d 74, 79 (1962), cert. denied,
874 U.S. 838 (1963).
130. Of. McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1957); People v.
Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268, 394 P.2d 952, 956 .(Sup. Ct. 1964).
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In Douglas v. California,1' 1 the Supreme Court held that the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
the indigent be afforded counsel on appeal. The Court said an un-
constitutional line was drawn between rich and poor if retained
counsel was allowed full argument as of right while indigent's
right to argument by counsel was conditioned.'m Similarly, where
appointment of counsel is afforded in juvenile courts upon request
the court cannot allow ignorance of that right to foreclose access to
appointed counsel.
C. COUNSEL AS ESSENTAL To DUE PRocEss FAo HEARIG -
RECENT TRENDs
There has been intrajurisdictional disagreement among courts
and legislatures about the essentials of a fair hearing in juvenile
proceedings. Courts which have looked beyond the noncriminal
label have clashed sharply with those bent on holding the line.
California and District of Columbia decisions provide representa-
tive illustrations.
In California the picture is forty years of indecision. In 1920
a district court of appeals held all criminal procedural safeguards
to be applicable in juvenile proceedings based on violations of
law.1 3 In 1924 the California Supreme Court held there was no
right to a jury trial in juvenile court.'34 In 1952 a district court
of appeals ordered a new trial for a boy found delinquent on in-
competent evidence, "thereby enabling said minor, with the aid
of counsel, to properly prepare and present a defense to the
charges .... ,,"1 Three years later a district court of appeals found
that since so many other traditional rights of criminal procedure
were inapplicable, "by a parity of reasoning the guaranty of the
right to counsel in criminal cases is likewise not applicable."'3 6
The court distinguished the 1952 case by confining its holding to
the sufficiency of competent evidence to support the finding, the
only matter on appeal.
In 1956 a convicted murderer alleged the absence of counsel in
juvenile court before being certified for trial in criminal court vio-
131. 872 U.S. 353 (1968).
182. Id. at 357.
133. Ex parte. Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
184. Ex parte Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924).
135. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 790, 241 P.2d 631, 684 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1952). (Emphasis added.)
136. People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 748, 289 Ped 808, 804
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
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lated due process since his ability to prove himself a proper sub-
ject for juvenile treatment was impaired. In People v. Dotson,'37
the California Supreme Court found no denial of due process. In
1961 California enacted statutes supplying counsel in delinquen-
cies of felony proportions and leaving appointment in other cases
to the discretion of the court. 88
Dotson is instructive as an insight into juvenile court due
process. The intermediate hearing, in which the juvenile court
decided young Dotson was not a proper subject for juvenile treat-
ment, was in no sense a proceeding against him. The court relied
on this fact to preclude any possible due process violation. Dotson
was never in jeopardy in juvenile court. A significant point is that
he did not claim the absence of counsel in juvenile court prejudiced
his case in criminal court.
The District of Columbia has experienced perhaps the most
checkered development of the right to counsel in juvenile court.
The municipal appellate court indicated in 1953 that a juvenile
has the right to have retained counsel appear in juvenile court 8 19
Two years later the federal district court held the juvenile's right
to counsel is derived directly from the sixth amendment. 40 In a
very strong opinion the court emphasized that juvenile delin-
quency rests on a determination of guilt where specific criminal
acts are alleged. Therefore, any juvenile proceeding alleging an
act which would be a crime if committed by an adult is imbued
with constitutional safeguards.' The court reasoned the legisla-
tive intent was to give the juvenile greater protection and also
expressed grave doubt whether the legislature had the power to
disallow any constitutional right by merely legislating certain
conduct to be noncriminal.'4
The following year Shioutakon v. District of Columbia,'48 a
case of delinquency based on a law violation confirmed, the non-
criminal nature of juvenile proceedings. However, it did not con-
sider due process requirements as to counsel. Rather, the court in-
terpreted the Juvenile Court Act as implicitly providing for notice
of the right to counsel and providing counsel in the case of
137. 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956). But see Kent v. United States,
86 Sup. Ct. 1045, 1053 (1966), where it is said that a valid transfer hearing
may not be held without assistance of counsel.
138. See CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 634.
189. Iu re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Munic. App. 1953).
140. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
141. Id. at 227.
142. Id. at 225-26.
143. 236 Fd 666 ,(D.C. Cir. 1956).
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indigency.144 The court stressed that perfecting an appeal and
drafting written motions required the assistance of counsel. The
court stated, "the right to be heard when personal liberty is at
stake requires the effective assistance of counsel in a juvenile
court quite as much as it does in a criminal court"'1 45 While the
Juvenile Court Act did not specifically mention the use of counsel
in juvenile court,1 4 by liberal construction the court neatly
avoided applying any part of the Bill of Rights to the juvenile
court.
In 1958 the district court picked up the line it had started
three years earlier- before Shiouta,on. The defendant pleaded
guilty in juvenile court before being certified for trial in criminal
court. The court held the juvenile could not be placed in double
jeopardy. 47 The court stated:
Ineluctable logic leads to the conclusion that the constitutional protec-
tion against double jeopardy, as is the case with the right to counsel and
the privilege against self-incrimination, is applicable to all proceedings,
irrespective of whether they are denominated criminal or civil, if the
outcome may be deprivation of liberty of the person ....148
The court of appeals reversed on the sole ground that jeopardy
had not yet attached in juvenile court 4 9 It is not clear from the
district court opinion whether it considered these constitutional
safeguards directly provided in the Bill of Rights or through fifth
amendment due process. At any rate, the court of appeals again
avoided making a firm precedent about due process requirements
in juvenile court.
Two court of appeals cases after Shioutakon make it clear that
the label of delinquency, along with potential deprivation of lib-
erty, determine the right to counsel. In a neglect case, In re Cus-
tody of a Minor, 0 the child, represented by a social director
rather than an attorney, was committed to the care of public
welfare. The court held there was no right to counsel since the
proceeding was not against the child, emphasizing that there was
no punishment involved.'5 ' On the other hand, in 1960 it held
144. Id. at 670.
145. Id. at 669.
146. See 52 Stat. 596-99 (1958) (now D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2801 through
16-2315 (Supp. IV, 1965)).
147. See United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958),
rev'd, 271 F.9d 487 .(D.C. Cir. 1959).
148. Id. at 901. (Emphasis added.)
149. See United States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
150. 250 F.d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
151. Id. at 420-41.
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that counsel should have been supplied in a case where a teenage
girl was found delinquent because she was "destitute of a suitable
guardian."'152 The court spoke of deprivation of liberty as one of
the intended consequences of the hearing. It stated that the child
was in jeopardy, and concluded, "with her liberty in the balance,
the assistance of counsel might well have furthered the best inter-
ests both of the child and of the authorities responsible in this
delicate area of social welfare."'' In 1963 Congress revised the
Juvenile Court Act, but again made no specific provision for
appointed counsel."5 4
These two jurisdictions represent the recent trends: concern
for procedural fairness; disregard of the noncriminal label; the use
of criminal procedure by analogy; and an appraisal of the elements
of juvenile court powers and abilities on their own merits. In Cali-
fornia, the legislature provided the right to counsel apparently to
avoid compelling a judicial determination that juvenile proceed-
ings were criminal. On the other hand, Congress left a great deal
unspecified in its revision of the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court Act. It was apparently satisfied to let the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals continue to define the procedural essentials
in juvenile proceedings. Since that court of appeals considers fifth
amendment due process to be the guidepost for juvenile rights,
further development should be instructive to the states concerned
under fourteenth amendment due process.
In both jurisdictions there has been an attitude that juveniles
need not submit themselves to the mercy of the governmental
parent. Whether this has been done in the name of constitutional
rights or of legislative policy makes little difference since the
foundation for both may be described as essential to a scheme
of ordered liberty. 155 The focus of these efforts to give standing to
the juvenile respondent has been to provide him with a competent
spokesman and partisan in the form of counsel. 58
Providing counsel is the first fundamental step essential to
give meaning to other rights which are appropriate to juvenile
proceedings. With more frequent appeals and informative debate
152. McDaniel v. Shea, P78 Fad 460 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
153. Id. at 462.
154. See D.C. CODE Arr. §§ 16-2301 through 16-2S15 (Supp. IV, 1965).
But see D.C. CoDE ANN. § 2-2202 (1961) (authorizes use of public defenders
in juvenile court proceedings); of. Blue v. United States, 842 F.ad 895 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
155. See Falko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
156. See Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New York: Juvenile Case
in the New Family Court, 48 CoNmmr L.Q. 499, 509 (1968).
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of juvenile procedures, the juvenile courts should gain strength
from meeting the test of social and constitutional validity. Where
the juvenile courts are unable to meet these tests, the particular
practices will be weeded out by the scrutiny of judicial review and
public opinion.
D. RoLE OF THE ATTORIY IN A JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
H1EARING
A further word about the attorney's role in a delinquency hear-
ing seems warranted. Initially he is faced with some difficult
ethical and practical problems. Usually he is retained by the
child's parents to represent both the child and themselves. 57 This
situation has potential difficulties because the interests are sep-
arable and possibly conflicting. 58 For example, in the ordinary
delinquency case the parents have a legitimate interest in resisting
jurisdiction which might result in the court preempting their right
of custody. If the child wishes to admit to a petition alleging
delinquency, and his attorney has no personal doubts that the
allegations are correct, there would be such a conflict. Conflict
could also arise where the parents want to retain custody and the
child's best interests would be served by placing him in the cus-
tody of more responsible adults. An even more extreme case arises
when the delinquency alleged is "waywardness," and the attorney
becomes convinced that it is really a case of parental neglect. A
motion for substitution of a neglect petition against the parents
may be the child's only legitimate defense 59
In each of these examples shared confidences with either the
child or his parents could have occurred before the conflict became
apparent. Total withdrawal from the case is the attorney's only
way out of this dilemma.
What has been said so far about conflicting interests is premised
on the assumption that the child is entitled to a status independ-
ent of his parents for purposes of the delinquency proceedings.
This problem does not exist in criminal prosecutions because
resistance is considered the common interest of both parent and
juvenile. Nor is there a problem in delinquency cases where par-
ents have originated the petition against their own child. By so
157. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J.
FAmmY L. 77, 83 (1964).
158. See McMullan, The Lawyer's Role in the Juvenile Court, 8 PRAc.
LAw. 49, 53 (No. 4 1962).
159. See Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the
New Family Court, 12 Bu FALo L. Ruv. 501, 511 (1963).
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doing the parents have waived their parental prerogative of con-
trol over the child.
In situations of potential conflict, the parents lose some of
their prerogatives to determine the child's best interests while
defending against the state's challenge to that prerogative. Par-
ental rights are never so pervasive as to eliminate the child's in-
dependent identity in the eyes of the law. Under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments the child is entitled to a hearing on the
question of delinquency. However, the juvenile does not have
those rights if his parents can waive his right to a prima facie
showing of delinquency by admitting to the allegations in the
petition. Thus the child, or his attorney as guardian ad litem,
must make the final decision on matters affecting his constitu-
tional rights to ensure their exercise in the juvenile's best interests.
It is apparent in certain situations an attorney should not rep-
resent both the child and his parents.1 10 If the parents desire inde-
pendent representation, the attorney should insist that separate
counsel be retained for the child." 1 If he is hired to represent the
child, it should be understood that the child's interests alone will
guide the course of his representation.
The attorney as guardian ad litem, must decide the scope of
his responsibility to make the final decision on matters which
affect the child's fundamental rights. When he is convinced that
the allegations of delinquency are well-founded and the child
needs treatment, should he admit the allegations in the child's
behalf even if the juvenile wants to resist?1 2 The answer is de-
cidedly "no." In the first place neither the question of delinquency
nor the need for treatment is a matter for him to decide. If the
allegation is "waywardness," even the juvenile may not know
whether he has been delinquent within the statutory definition;
this question is for the court. By thus dispensing with the delin-
quency hearing over his client's objection, the attorney sets him-
self up as another parens patriae - without statutory control.
Secondly, it is quite likely the attorney has become convinced
of his client's delinquency partly as a result of confidences which
his client has shared with him. The need for a jealously protected
attorney-client privilege is as strong in juvenile court as in any
160. Cf. McMullan, supra note 158, at 53; Oughterson, Family Court Juris-
diction, 12 BUFFA o L. REV. 467, 471 (1963).
161. See Isaacs, supra note 159, at 511.
162. See generally Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary Sys-
term: Problems& of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 43-44; Isaacs,
supra note 159, at 512-15.
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other instance.'6 3 In juvenile court it is especially important that
the defendant have complete confidence that his case has been
fully presented and that the state's case has been fully tested
before any treatment or correction is undertaken.
Finally, the juvenile has a personal right to not lose his free-
dom on less than a prima facie case. This is the most fundamental
element of due process. This right embodies notions of fair play,
a guarantee of reliability, and a recognition of the individual's
status before the law.
Although the attorney should follow the juvenile's wishes to
resist the petition, he should make him aware that this does not
necessitate a posture of uncompromising resistance. 6 4 Having
shown his willingness and duty to represent the child's legitimate
interests and protect his rights, the attorney is better situated
than anyone to explain the nature and objectives of the juvenile
courts.0 5 He should explain that the juvenile is not being tried as
a criminal, the court is not going to punish him, and criminal
court tactics of resistance are not appropriate in juvenile court.
Such an explanation will remove the prospect of a dramatic trial
from the juvenile's mind. It will make him aware that his attor-
ney's objective and purpose is to require an orderly presentation
of the true facts by complainant's witnesses - and no more. When
the juvenile is aware that the sensationalist aspects of unyielding
obstruction will not be present in the hearing, he may take a more
down-to-earth view of the entire proceedings.
Before the hearing, the attorney should investigate the pos-
sibility of informal or voluntary probation, if the juvenile is willing
to admit to the allegations. This device often affords necessary
supervision without the consequence of a delinquency record. 66
At the hearing the attorney must ensure an orderly presenta-
tion of legally dependable evidence going solely to the issue of
delinquency. He must see to it that the court renders a decision
on delinquency before any evidence related to disposition is
heard.167 Above all, the attorney in a delinquency hearing should
discard any personal interest in winning cases. Where punishment
163. Cf. id. at 507.
164. See id. at 507; Mlullan, supra note 158, at 52.
165. Cf. Handler, supra note 162, at 21.
166. Cf. Isaacs, supra note 159, at 509.
167. See Committee on Juvenile Courts, Los Angeles Bar Association,
The Attorney and the Juvenile Court, 80 Los ANGFLES B. Bum. 3ss, 343
(1955); Hall, Judicial Ethics for the Juvenile Court Judge, 3 3. F mly L.
248, 261 (1963); Isaacs, supra note 159, at 512-15; M Mullan, supra note 158,
at 54.
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has truly been eliminated, real "victory" is realized when a de-
linquent child has been rehabilitated. The real "defeat" lies in
obstructing the legitimate operation of the rehabilitation mechan-
ism.
It is during the disposition stage that an attorney probably
feels least at home. His efforts should be directed at obtaining an
effective program of treatment which imposes the minimum neces-
sary restrictions on the juvenile's freedom. This, however, is not
to say that the attorney should press for minimum restrictions
regardless of his client's needs for supervision. He should also
realize that the child is likely to view his own best interests as
maximum resistance to official interference.10 8 An attorney can
assist the court in making a thoroughly informed disposition by
volunteering information on the child's personality, homelife, asso-
ciates, and other matters in mitigation.j 69 He can also make sug-
gestions about the method of treatment, including a program of
probation on terms designed to isolate the juvenile from the cir-
cumstances which have led him into trouble. There are, of course,
limits to the information an attorney can volunteer. For instance,
revealing prior delinquent activity, although useful to the court,
probably falls within the attorney-client privilege. If the attorney
has no positive contributions, his negative arguments will most
likely be ignored. Even when the attorney plans an appeal, al-
though he should be cautious about what information he volun-
teers to the court, he should not forego contributing to a plan for
treatment suited to the child's needs in the event he should not
prevail upon appeal.
After disposition, the attorney should fully explain the terms,
duration, and objectives to the juvenile, and his parents or guard-
ian. He should explain that the degree of acceptance and coopera-
tion will largely determine its effectiveness and duration in meet-
ing those objectives. He should also inform all parties of the con-
sequences attending a violation of its terms or of maintaining an
attitude of resistance and defiance, and should try to impart his
confidence that the plan is a fair one designed for correction rather
168. Cf. ibid.; Skoler & Tenney, supra note 157, at 83. Of the judges
surveyed only 15% reported that the government appeared by an attorney
regularly in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
169. Of. Handler, supra note 162, at 34; Isaacs, supra note 159, at 507,
516; Treadwell, The Lawyer in Juvenile Court Di positional Proceedings:
Advocate, Social Worker, or Otherwise, 16 JUVENUM CT. JUDGES 3. 109, 113
(1965).
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than punishment. His chances of succeeding in these regards are
much better than are those of a government official.17 1
To a great extent the attorney's effectiveness in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding will depend upon his relations with the
judge and probation officer. 7 ' If they feel his primary objective is
to resist the court, they will probably not be disposed to discuss
the matter informally before the hearing. To the extent that the
judge feels the attorney appreciates the ideals and objectives of
the juvenile court system, he will be receptive to argument at the
hearing and more sensitive to any resistance.
IV. OTHER DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
OF A DELINQUENCY DETERMINATION
A. Ruiis oF EVDENCE
The juvenile court must have a reliable method of determining
who is subject to its jurisdiction. Whether these factual findings
must be supported by a preponderance of evidence or beyond a
reasonable doubt, the evidence itself must be sufficient to enable
the judge to make a finding of fact rather than merely take the
word of a police officer, probation officer, or parent. 721 Basic as
this proposition sounds it is not always followed. 7 3
Of course it is difficult for the rules of evidence to be meaning-
ful in the absence of counsel since they are certainly beyond the
knowledge of the vast majority of youngsters facing the court. It
can be argued that the judge can distinguish the valid from
untrustworthy evidence. 74 However, even a judge may have
difficulty determining the motivations and observations under-
170. Of. Handler, supra note 162, at 20-21. See also Isaacs, supra note
159, at 507; McMullan, supra note 158, at 54--55; Treadwell, upra note 169,
at 112. Apparently this is the ptrimary role envisioned for the attorney injuvenile court by some. See ADVIsoRY CoUJ rCILO JUDGES OF THE NATIONAJ
PROBATION & PAnoLE AssocrATio & NATIONAL CouNcn. OF Juvnm
COURT JUDGES, GUIDES FOR JUVEILE COURT JUDGES 66 (1957), where the
judge is urged to welcome the attorney "for very often he may help the
family in understanding and accepting the court's plan." Nowhere is special
mention made of the attorney's role or value in the delinquency determination
hearing.
171. See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MMr. L. REv. 547,
567 (1957).
172. Of. In re Allamaras, 139 Mont. 130, 361 P.2d 340 (1961).
173. See cases collected in Annot., 43 A.LR.2d 1128, 1143-44 (1955).
174. See Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); In re
Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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lying a hearsay statement, even though he is suspicious of its
credibility.17 5 He may need the gentle reminder of the exclusion-
ary rules to avoid relying on less trustworthy but more convenient
sources of information, such as written ex parte reports by social
workers.
Some courts allow hearsay statements but require the delin-
quency determination to be supported by a preponderance of
nonhearsay evidence. 70 But if incompetent evidence may not con-
tribute to the finding, why is it allowed at all? The practice is an
example of mixing evidence relevant to a delinquency determina-
tion with that relevant for disposition. The majority of jurisdic-
tions, however, hold the rules of evidence applicable to juvenile
court.
1 77
Statutory prohibitions against using evidence presented in
juvenile hearings in any other court proceeding 78 do not justify
abandoning the rules of evidence in juvenile hearings. Such stat-
utes are designed to reduce the stigma of delinquency determina-
tions, to provide immunity against self-incrimination, and afford
some semblance of protection against double jeopardy. These
objectives are extrinsic to the delinquency determining process.
Insofar as relaxed rules of evidence may lead to questionable de-
linquency determinations they tend to allow juvenile courts to
exceed their jurisdiction by prescribing guidance for nondelin-
quents.
Appeal from a delinquency finding is generally available.
Where the judge sits as the sole determiner of fact and law the
rules of evidence are an essential aid to the reviewing court. With-
out rules on admissibility the appellate court must either inde-
pendently evaluate the evidence and substitute its discretion for
that of the trial court or completely defer to the discretion of the
trial court as to every item presented.
Informality in juvenile proceedings conserves time and lessens
the psychological impression that the court is proceeding against
the juvenile. Nevertheless, our legal system is replete with checks
and restraints. While all these "technicalities" are time consuming,
175. Of. Holmes' Appeal, 879 Pa. 599, 614, 109 A.2d 528, 529 (1954)(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
176. See id. at 606, 109 A.2d at 526; CAL. WEr.m & INsTx's CoDE §
701.
177. Cf. In re Hill, 78 Cal. App. 23, 247 Pac. 591 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926);
In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 ,(1954); People v. Lewis, 260
N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932); Antieau, Constitutional Rights in
Juvenile Courts, 46 CoiumLL L.Q. 887, 401 (1961).
178. See authorities cited note 5 supra.
684 [Vol. 50:653
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
hasty, unilateral, subjective decisions are regarded as in considered
and tend to reduce public confidence in the courts. Hence the tech-
nicalities are retained. Whatever the court gains by a less op-
pressive atmosphere, more will be lost when a child is unjustly
found delinquent.1 79 The juvenile court as an institution must be
accepted and respected, especially by the parents and children
who appear before it, if it is to obtain the cooperation necessary
for effective guidance and rehabilitation. The cost of complete
informality, to the system and to the individual, is too high to be
counterbalanced by a veneer of paternalism. This is especially true
to the extent that formalities can be reduced without a correspond-
ing reduction in the dependability of its factual findings.
B. PmvIGE AGAInST SELF-INCRIMIATION
The fifth and fourteenth amendments allow silence if speaking
will tend to incriminate the witness. 80 When a juvenile is com-
pelled to answer in juvenile court, is he incriminating himself?
Where the juvenile hearing can be preliminary to a criminal trial,
or where the child is subject to a criminal trial in addition to the
juvenile proceeding,181 the answer is clearly yes. To deny protec-
tion when the juvenile is exposed to prosecution in criminal court
violates due process. 82 It would also seem to be an invidious dis-
crimination in criminal procedure favoring adult over youthful
defendants.
The statutes preventing the use of evidence introduced in
juvenile court in any other proceeding'83 protect the juvenile as
to the evidence presented, but they do not protect him from evi-
dence uncovered as a result of the excluded evidence.' 84 Since any
link in the chain of evidence falls under the privilege,' 85 the ju-
venile respondent should have full immunity from criminal prose-
179. Of. TAPP.w, JuvBNiI DEIwQUENCY 208-09 (lst ed. 1949); Waite,
How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized Without Impairing Individual
Rights?, 12 J. Crmu. L., C. & P.S. 339, 8343-44 (1921).
180. See Mkalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
181. See People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1953); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958).
182. Cf. Ex parte Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (Dist. Ct. App.
1920).
188. See authorities cited in note 5 supra.
184. Cf. Gallegos v. People, 145 Colo. 53, 358 P.2d 1028, 1032-83 (1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). But see Wong Sun v. United
States, 871 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 808 U.S. 338,
341 (1939), which held that an effective exclusion also includes the fruits of
the condemned activity. See also Paulsen, supra note 171, at 562.
185. Hoffiman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
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cution before he is compelled to answer' 8s6 This constitutional
protection is necessitated by the threat of criminal prosecution,
not by the character of the juvenile proceedings.
Where a specific crime is alleged, delinquency draws its content
from the criminal law. In such a situation the stigma of criminal
conduct and exposure to commitment for a significant period
suggest the procedure has criminal repercussions. The juvenile
defendant should not have to choose between perjuring himself
or stigmatizing himself and possibly losing his liberty.187 This is
fundamental fairness, even if not within the wording of the fifth
amendment privilege.5s
Arguably, the existing practice of affording immunity from
criminal prosecution and then compelling the witness to testify
on pain of contempt meets the argument that self-imposed stigma
tends to self-incrimination. It is important to recognize, however,
that these immunity provisions apply to witnesses in proceedings
to which they are not a party.' 9 The stigma is thereby confined
to a record not easily identified with such witnesses. In the case
of the juvenile who is a party to the proceedings, the delinquency
finding becomes a part of the court record. Even though these
records are generally confidential, a finding of delinquency may
be considered in determining disposition of any subsequent crimi-
nal conviction. 90 Furthermore, as earlier indicated,19' future em-
ployers and others may inquire about prior delinquency findings,
whereas the likelihood of their inquiring about any prior admission
of criminal conduct while a witness is extremely remote. Addi-
tionally the accused in a criminal case has traditionally enjoyed
the privilege to refuse to testify at all, whereas the witness may
only decline to answer specific questions that tend to incrimi-
186. Cf. Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 605, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
187. Compare Paulsen, supra note 171, at 561. Professor Paulsen bases
his rejection of the privilege on the premise that the proceedings are "truly
protective and non-accusatory."
188. Cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937). Only under the view of "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights
into due process would the express wording of the amendment be compelling.
For example, in Palko due process was held to be grounded in notions of
fundamental fairness.
189. See 8 WIGmORE, EvMENCS § 2.281 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
190. See Commonwealth ex Tel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 144
A.2d 367 (1958); 1 WiGmonE, EvIDENcE § 196, 673-76 (3d ed. 1940, Supp.
1964); Rappeporf, Some Legal Aspects of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 46 VA.
L. REv. 908, 914-15 (1960).
191. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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nate.192 This differing breadth of the privilege is partially attri-
butable to the fact that a witness does not suffer from the
prejudice generated against him in the eyes of the trier of fact by
his refusal to answer questions, whereas an accused might.
A survey several years ago revealed several counties in Cali-
fornia regularly certified juvenile cases to the criminal courts
when the respondent refused to testify in juvenile court. 9 3 Under
this practice it made little difference if there was a privilege in
juvenile court. Judge Alexander considers a confession by the
juvenile a sine qua non of the juvenile court's reformative mission.
Since the child must assent to the court's rehabilitative efforts for
them to be effective, the normal acts of a lawyer schooled in the
adversary system may minimize the likelihood of the child co-
operating. This quest for confessions is likened to a doctor's
concern in treating a sick child.'94 The analogy may be a fair one,
but it fails to prove what is intended; no doctor would ever insist
that a child diagnose his own case upon peril of being deemed
unsuitable for treatment merely because he refuses to cooperate.
The claim that cooperation by the juvenile is essential to the
successful operation of the juvenile courts cannot be advanced to
support eliminating the privilege. If the juvenile is willing to con-
fess, fully realizing the court's powers over his future freedom, the
privilege is deemed to be waived. If he is not willing to do so, it is
hard to see how compulsion by the court will contribute to a spirit
of cooperation. Failure to warn the juvenile of his right to remain
silent seems hypocritical in the face of the professed concern for
his best interests. If the privilege is recognized, the juvenile should
be informed of his right to remain silent. 9 5
A related issue is the use of out-of-court confessions. The very
practice of obtaining a confession away from judicial protection
belies the notion that the juvenile is not being prosecuted.
The dangers of the juvenile's rights being abused by an out-of-
192. See McCoumrIC, EVIDF CE § 122, at 257-59 (1954), 8 WiGmom, Evi-
DENCE § 2251, at 296 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
193. See Note, 10 STAN. L. REv. 471, 475, 476 n.29 (1958). Kent v. United
States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1966), held that the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court must afford the juvenile a full hearing prior to certifying him for crimi-
nal trial and must state its reasons for doing so. Id. at 1057.
194. See Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 A.B.A.J.
1206, 1208 (1960).
195. See Note, 10 STAN. L. REv. 471, 497-98 (1958). in California the
juvenile respondent is accorded the privilege but not warned of its existence.
There is no statute in California precluding evidence in juvenile hearings from
use in other courts. Compare N.Y. FAr~ny CT. ACT § 728.
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court confession are considerably greater than when such confes-
sions are taken from adults. 198 Furthermore, if the juvenile, after
having been properly advised of his best interests, is truly willing
to confess, there seems little reason to rely on a confession taken
before the court hearing. Thus, this practice seems inherently
inconsistent with the desired spirit of cooperation among the
court, the juvenile, and his parents.
The California Welfare and Institutions Code allows the use
of out-of-court confessions unless the juvenile repudiates it at the
hearing. 97 There are two difficulties with this procedure: (1) the
court, sitting as trier of fact, knows of the existence of a prior con-
fession; (9) if a confession is repudiated, a continuance is often
required to allow collection of other evidence.
Both of these defects could be corrected by: (1) disallowing any
confession taken before the juvenile has conferred with counsel;
(2) making a confession signed by both the juvenile and his coun-
sel binding in court. This amounts to no more than the preparation
of a written stipulation of facts.
The same mechanism can be used for admissions, thus elimina-
ting undisputed elements of the petition and concentrating the
court's time and attention on disputed elements. It also affords
a partial waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination with
less prejudice in the eyes of the trier of fact by the juvenile's reluc-
tance to answer questions. He may remain off the stand and yet
divulge so much as he desires without committing himself to a
complete confession.
These stipulations of fact must not be used in criminal court
should the juvenile court certify the case for trial there. Existing
statutes for excluding evidence presented in juvenile court are
insufficient. 98 For example, the juvenile court could waive juris-
diction before receiving the confession. In any event there could
be a dispute as to whether the juvenile court has received a con-
fession within the meaning of the exclusion statutes when it certi-
fied the case for trial elsewhere. Safeguards are required whereby
such confessions and stipulated admissions, whether previously
presented or not, are completely excluded from use in any other
court.
A problem thus far peculiar to the District of Columbia ju-
196. Of. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 882
U.S. 596 (1948).
197. See CAL. WELFARE & I[NsT'NS CODE § 701.
198. See 1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 196 n.5 (8d ed. 1940).
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venile court is the interrelationship of the McNabb-Mallory 99
rule and the intermediate jurisdiction of the juvenile court when
it certifies a case for trial in criminal court2 00 The juvenile is only
protected by McNabb-Mallory after waiver of jurisdiction by the
juvenile court. 01 Federal officers comply with the rule by taking
the juvenile directly from juvenile court to the United States
Commissioner. However, the juvenile may have been detained
for five days 02 prior to his juvenile hearing. In terms of detention
before arraignment the juvenile does not get protection equal to
that given an adult.
Excluding any confession given before certification by the ju-
venile court would not alone meet the problem, which is one of
exposure to interrogation. The juvenile may be intermittently
questioned over a period which would clearly violate McNabb-
Mallory if he were arrested as an adult. Even though the particu-
lar confession introduced was taken after waiver of juvenile juris-
diction, if the respondent is subsequently treated as an adult, the
period of availability for police interrogation must be measured
from the time of original apprehension as a juvenile.
One approach to solving this dilemma is to extend the
MoNabb-Mallory rule into juvenile apprehensions. This means
any apprehended child of appropriate age accused of an offense
for which he could be tried criminally would have to be brought
before a United States Commissioner before he could be placed in
detention. This would cover the possibility that the juvenile court
might certify the case for trial in a criminal court. In the vast
majority of cases, however, this would be wasted effort. Also, a
criminal procedure would be introduced which has no place or
purpose in the juvenile system. 03 Further, it would set the child
in a criminal defense posture before he even got into juvenile
199. Mallory v. United States, 854 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 818 U.S. 882 (1943).
200. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (Supp. IV, 1965).
201. See Harling v. United States, 295 F2?d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Compare
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1964) which provides
prompt arraignment before a United States Commissioner. This problem is
closely related to that of evidence obtained in contravention of McNabb-
Mallory by state officers before federal arrest. See Pee v. United States, 274
F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal
State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MwNr. L. REv. 1083, 1183--85
(1959).
202. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965).
203. Of. larling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961), holding
the rule inapplicable to juvenile proceedings.
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court, and would minimize the chances of obtaining the desired
cooperation.
The root of the problem is detention of the juvenile for a sig-
niicant period of time before a decision is made as to which juris-
diction will hear the case. Releasing children to their parents after
apprehension is the favored policy of the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court Act. A child should be detained only if the safety
of the child or of others requires it. Where detention is ordered,
the child should be isolated from adults and policemen. Any infor-
mation obtained by a case worker or probation officer should be
for juvenile court use only. If these steps are followed, and if a
child is brought before the Commissioner immediately upon
waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court, police access for
interrogation would be minimized without the undesirable side
effects of strict compliance with MeNabb-Mallory.
Confessions elicited from juveniles must be treated more cau-
tiously than those taken from an adult for the additional reason
that a juvenile may often be apprehended without probable
cause 0 4 If Wong Sun v. United States2°5 requires suppressing any
confession or admission preceded by an illegal arrest, any con-
fession or admission made after apprehension of a juvenile on less
than probable cause would be inadmissible in criminal court.
C. JmRY TRUL
According to the famous opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in
Palko v. ConnecticutY the fourteenth amendment does not guar-
antee a trial by jury in state criminal courts. Several Supreme
Court cases have repeated that view and have not found the sixth
amendment right to jury trial to be overriding 0 7 In the federal
jurisdictions, the sixth amendment is directly applicable to crimi-
nal proceedings. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 0 8 requires
the juvenile to waive a jury trial before the juvenile court acquires
jurisdiction. If such waiver is not made, the juvenile is tried in
criminal court where he has a jury as of right. The District of
204. See, e.g., Rubin, Protecting the Child in Juvenile Court, 43 J. CnR.
L., C. & P.S. 425, 433-34 (1952); Note, 49 GEO. L.J. 322, 825 (1960). But see
CAL. WEZARE & INST'ZNS CODE § 625; N.Y. FA-my CT. AcT § 721; ORE.
REv. STAT. §§ 419.486, .569 (1963).
205. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
206. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
207. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961); Fay v. New York,
332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1964).
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Columbia Juvenile Court Act provides for a jury trial upon
request.2°9
Much courtroom formality is designed to impress upon the
jury the solemnity of their duties as well as to simplify the receipt
of evidence. Such formality is, therefore, unnecessary where the
trier of fact is a judge. Counsel's approach to a single trier of fact
is likely to be more straightforward - the courtroom is more
businesslike and less a stage. These aspects of nonjury trial are
consistent with the objectives of the juvenile court acts. Nonjury
trial is also consistent with the notion of a private hearing, attract-
ing as little publicity as possible.
The jury must answer the same questions when a delinquent
is charged with specific criminal acts as it must in an adult crimi-
nal case. Thus, tradition favors a jury trial in this situation. Other
types of delinquency involve rather ill-defined notions of wayward-
ness and unmanageability,210 and the maintenance of some sem-
blance of uniform standards among them dictates trial before a
judge. For either category of delinquency, the juvenile may be
committed to an institution 11 If a jury trial is applicable to one
category, it should be to the others as well, at least insofar as
rights are responsive to potential state impingement on the re-
spondent's freedom. Insofar as fairness requires a common stand-
ard of conduct upon which all are to be judged, the respondent
facing a less specific charge should not have a jury, unless it is a
permanent body which tries all such cases. Viewed in this respect,
it would seem that the absence of a jury is fairer to the juvenile
respondent than is its use.
A jury trial may be in the juvenile's best interests insofar as
some courts are either careless or unwilling to consider the deter-
mination of delinquency before considering an appropriate dispo-
sition. The jury may provide the necessary external mechanism to
segment the proceedings. However, the jury seems a rather clumsy
and expensive tool for this purpose where specific statutes would
be adequate. 2 It is the jury's capabilities as a factfnder which
should recommend it- not a collateral benefit from its presence.
In light of these considerations, the fourteenth amendment does
not require a jury trial in state juvenile proceedings. Failure to
209. In the District of Columbia a jury trial may be had upon request in
juvenile court. See D.C. CODE ANw. § 16-2307 (Supp. IV, 1965).
210. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1551 (Supp. IV, 1965).
211. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 419.476, .509, .511 (1963).
212. See, e.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§ 701-06; N.Y. FAMILY CT.
ACT §§ 742-46.
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provide a jury does not seem to deny due process nor does it un-
fairly discriminate against juveniles.213
D. RIGHT TO BAmI
The juvenile acts generally favor releasing a child to his parents
pending hearing. 14 Any detention before hearing not ordered by
the court may violate the fourteenth amendment in view of the
fact that: (1) a juvenile may be apprehended on less than prob-
able cause2'5 (2) the policy of the juvenile acts is against punitive
incarceration; (3) detention deprives the parents of their right to
care and control of the child as well as depriving the child of his
liberty. If the processing machinery is essentially the same as that
used to process criminals, a veneer of noncriminal treatment in
juvenile court would not offset the unconstitutionality of an arrest
without probable cause or of punitive incarceration pending hear-
ing. If the system adheres to its professed objectives, the instances
of interim detention should be low.
Where interim detention is ordered, it should be based on safety
to the community or safety of the child. Such a determination
should be made by the court at the earliest practicable time with
opportunity for the juvenile to confer with counsel. This will
assure that the child is being detained for a well-considered rea-
son.1 There is no reason why the child could not be ordered into
detention pending hearing on the merits after a detention hearing.
Unfortunately, detention hearings put an extra load on the court
which may lead to longer detentions pending the delinquency
hearing.
If detention is intended to guarantee attendance at the delin-
quency hearing, bail would seem to follow as of right. This con-
sideration seems to be fundamental in setting bail in criminal
cases. 17 If the bond system is in effect and no collateral is required
of the defendant, there is no forfeiture for not appearing. The de-
fendant either appears or not because of other considerations -
218. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963): "[A] state can,
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long
as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an 'invidious dis-
crimination."'
214. See, e.g., D.C. Cone ANN. § 16-2306 .(Supp. IV, 1965); N.Y. FAmmy
CT. ACT § 72.; ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 419.573 (1963).
215. See authorities cited in note 204 supra.
216. Compare CAL. WELPw & INsT'xs CODE §§ 625-36; D.C. CoDE ANw.
§ 16-2806 (Supp. IV, 1965). See also Note, 49 GEo. L. J. 322, 331-85 (1960).
217. Of. Stack v. Boyle, 842 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951); State v. Konigsberg, 33
NJ. 367, 378, 164 A.2d 740, 742 (1960).
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bail is merely a fee for getting released from jail.218 A system which
places a higher premium on attendance at a noncriminal, non-
punitive hearing than at a criminal proceeding raises serious equal
protection problems under the fourteenth amendment. This treat-
ment also raises questions about the credibility of labeling delin-
quency commitments nonpunitive. If the child is to be helped
rather than punished, it is inconsistent to assume he is less likely
to appear in juvenile court than in criminal court.
Again the problem is the overlapping jurisdiction of criminal
and juvenile court. While being considered for treatment as a
juvenile the defendant may not be released on bail. But should
his case be certified for trial in criminal court he then may be re-
leased. Arguably, were the child slated solely for juvenile court
handling, the denial of bail could be justified in terms of his lack of
responsibility before the law. His immunity from the criminal law
would then be complete. But noncriminal treatment does not turn
on level of responsibility, it turns on suitability for rehabilitation.
This must be determined on a case by case basis. As long as the
child is potentially exposed to trial as a criminal, it must be
assumed that he is held accountable before the law as an adult.
His right to bail should not be based on a subsequent determina-
tion of whether he is to be tried as a child or an adult. 19
Some courts have suggested that the juvenile's right to bail
exists when the applicable statute is silent on the subject.2 In-
herent in this analysis is the idea that a statutory deprivation is
sufficient to eliminate any constitutional right to bail which other-
wise would exist. Perhaps this analysis goes no further than sug-
gesting that noncriminal proceedings are those so labeled by the
legislature, and the label forecloses discussion of rights tradi-
tionally afforded in criminal proceedings. The fallacy in this
theory has already been discussed.
Some courts recognize the right to bail when there is incarcera-
tion before a final determination?22' So viewed, it does not matter
whether detention can fairly be called treatment. Such treatment
is premature. This is sound analysis.
218. Of. Pannell v. United States, 820 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(Wright, J. concurring).
219. See O~n. REV. STAT. §§ 419.533, .583 .(1963).
220. See Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); Cinque v.
Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 94, 121 Atl. 678, 686 (1928).
221. Cf. Trhnble v. Stone, supra note 220; State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439,
12 So. 2d 211 (1943). Contra, In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d
362 (Dist. Qt. App. 1952); Espinos v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576
(1945).
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If the relevant statute is silent on the subject, it should be
read as assuming the right to bail exists when a child is placed in
detention. If release on bail is denied by statute, it must be de-
nied only after a judicial determination that considerations of
safety require detention. Any other justification for detention
without bail discriminates against the child. At least in the situ-
ation where the child may be certified for criminal trial, there
seems little doubt that this discrimination violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
A new view of the procedural due process requirements for the
juvenile courts is needed. Procedural minimums should be spe-
cially tailored just as they have been for criminal procedure. The
noncriminal label is not a sufficient justification for the summary
proceedings paired with the extensive judicial power which now
prevails. Resistance to procedural safeguards results largely from
fears of a comparison to the criminal court system and a whole-
sale importation of its procedures. It is fear of what attorneys
might do and of what the public might think. There is probably
very little objection to procedural safeguards aimed at ensuring
the reliability of the delinquency determination procedure.
The juvenile court system is only half-bold and invites un-
wanted analogy to the criminal system, including direct applica-
tions of some procedures. It will continue to do so as long as
jurisdiction over juveniles remains divided between criminal and
juvenile courts. A complete separation of criminal and juvenile
proceedings is essential for the maintenance of different proced-
ures. Divorcing juvenile from criminal proceedings would entail
giving content to the criteria of "suitability for treatment as a
juvenile" in statutory form.Y Once a juvenile is found suitable for
treatment he should not be exposed to a criminal trial for the
same offense.
The child's need for counsel is much greater than that of the
adult criminal defendant. Not only is his age and experience a dis-
advantage, but he is afforded fewer tools to resist the loss of his
liberty. His need of a spokesman and confidant is further increased
if the finder of fact concentrates attention on reformation rather
than on the existence of delinquency. The need of counsel in ju-
222. See Kent v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1966), where not only
were such criteria deemed essential, but a hearing to collect information and
a deliberate application of them to the facts was held to be a jurisdictional
prerequisite to subsequent prosecution as an adult. Id. at 1057.
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venile court does not vary with the seriousness of the alleged
conduct since usually neither the label of delinquency nor the
power to deprive the child of his liberty relates to the seriousness
of the offense. Where the child is exposed to overlapping criminal
and juvenile jurisdiction, the skillful exercise of his rights and ap-
preciation of their changing complexion becomes much more
complicated. Here an attorney is essential to navigate a prudent
course and conserve the child's posture for criminal trial.
The need for counsel has become the focal point of critics of the
summary procedures employed by juvenile courts. Few of the
procedural safeguards afforded are meaningful to the child who is
unaware of them or unskilled in their use. Therefore, it is central
to the effective utilization of all safeguards that the child be
informed of his right to the assistance of counsel. Both notions of
due process and equal protection dictate that every alleged de-
linquent child should be afforded a meaningful opportunity to
have the assistance of counsel as soon as official steps are taken
which might lead to deprivation of his liberty.
The attorfiey who participates in juvenile proceedings must
leave his criminal court strategy behind. He must contribute his
own efforts toward implementing the philosophy of the juvenile
court. If the procedures used are questionable within the context
of juvenile court, he should seek to revise them on appeal and
elsewhere. However, he must critically appraise his own approach
to the juvenile forum to avoid dogmatisms borrowed wholesale
from criminal law. Maximum resistance is not always in his client's
best interests. His client is one who is presumed by all of society
to be incapable of deciding his ultimate best interests. His role
must include that of confidant and spokesman, yet he must temper
his resistance to the court by recognizing that the child may be
headed for greater difficulty in the future. Counsel may invite
future trouble if his actions indicate to the child that the court is
a state institution which will only impose on the individual. Fur-
ther, he must maintain and defend his client's rightful standing
in the proceedings, and yet leave room for the state's legitimate
interests once it has justified its right to act.
Applying the rules of evidence is essential to assure that a
child is not subjected to treatment until a reliable determination
of delinquency has been made. The rules are also essential to
establish uniform standards for appellate review. Both of these
needs are heightened in juvenile proceedings where the elements
of delinquency are often vague and left to the subjective discre-
tion of the juvenile judge.
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Due process draws on the substance of the policy underlying
the privilege against self-incrimination through the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. Therefore, it is unsatisfactory to deny the
privilege in juvenile proceedings solely because they are not
denominated as criminal proceedings. The consequences of "crimi-
nality" must be the measuring rod for procedural fairness under
the test of due process. Insofar as such consequences may be im-
posed on the juvenile directly as a result of a delinquency finding,
or by eventual criminal conviction, the reason for the existence of
the privilege remains.
Juveniles should be detained prior to hearing only when deten-
tion is necessary for the safety of the child or the community.
Where the state constitution provides for bail prior to trial,
juveniles as a class are discriminated against in an arbitrary fash-
ion - the noncriminal label is used to justify arrest without prob-
able cause and detention before the state has demonstrated its
right to exercise coercive power. Allowing nonjudicial officers to
decide if temporary detention is necessary invites treatment
before either the child or his parents have been heard on the
merits.
The juvenile court system is a bold scheme which assaults
some rather deeply entrenched notions about what courts can
and should do. If successful in all it professes to do, there would
be little objection to its informal factflnding approach. The fail-
ure of treatment in practice, and the fact that many courts act
in the same manner as adult criminal courts, initiated comparison
with the criminal system. In many parts of the nation, legislative
action has brought procedures of the juvenile courts more in line
with the ideals of the system. These actions have temporarily
retarded grave constitutional objections in the state supreme
courts. Continuing legislative response to the system's practical
limitations should stave off wholesale analogies to the criminal
courts in appellate review of the constitutionality of juvenile
proceedings.
